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## 1NC Nuclear Meltdowns

### Backup generators stop blackout meltdowns – reliable.

Korea Times April 20, 2011 (Wednesday “Electrical failure causes nuclear reactor to use backup generator”)

An electrical system failure caused one of South Korea's nuclear reactors to temporarily use an emergency backup generator, a state nuclear power company said Tuesday. The Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. (KHNP) said the Gori-4 reactor in the northeastern part of Busan, South Korea's largest port, experienced a minor problem with power cables that bring in outside electricity to run key systems. The KHNP said that due to the problem that took place around 2 p.m., a backup diesel generator was turned on and used for 90 minutes to keep the 950-megawatt reactor online. "The Gori-4 unit that started commercial operations in April 1986 is currently generating power normally and all primary electrical systems have been restored with the backup generator turned off," the KHNP said. It added that the generator is designed to turn on automatically 10 seconds after any power failure. The power company, meanwhile, said that the power was lost when a slight problem occurred at the nearby Gori-3 reactor, which has been shut down as of April 4 for regular maintenance. It said the Gori-3 and Gori-4 reactors share the same electrical lines that bring in power from the outside so that if a problem occurs with one system, the other is also affected. The incident comes as the KHNP said it had to turn off the Gori-1 reactor located in the same plant last Tuesday due to problems in the circuit breaker that powered all vital cooling systems. On-site engineers originally said the reactor would go online over the weekend, but government policymakers called for more time to determine the exact cause of the stoppage. The Gori-1 is a 587-megawatt power unit, and is the oldest of South Korea's 21 commercial reactors. It started commercial operations in April 1978.

### No impact to nuclear meltdowns – Humans are constantly hit by radiation with no effects.

BROAD , May 2 2011 (WILLIAM J, who is an author and a senior writer at The New York Times. In twenty-five years as a science correspondent, he has written hundreds of front-page articles and won every major journalistic award in print and film. His reporting has explored everything from exploding stars and the lives of marine mammals to the spread of nuclear arms and the speed at which RMS Titanic sank. “Drumbeat of Nuclear Fallout Fear Doesn’t Resound With Expertshttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/science/03radiation.html?pagewanted=all”)

The nuclear disaster in Japan has sent waves of radiation and dread around the globe, prompting so many people to buy radiation detectors and potassium iodide to fend off thyroid cancer that supplies quickly sold out. Multimedia The fear is unwarranted, experts say. People in Japan near the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant may have reason to worry about the consequences of radiation leaks, scientists say, and some reactor workers, in particular, may suffer illness. But outside of Japan, the increase is tiny, compared with numerous other sources of radiation, past and present. Experts say that humans are bombarded by so much radiation from so many other sources, including many natural ones, that the uptick from Japan disappears as a cause of concern the big picture is considered. That perspective suggests a human population and a global environment in which exposure to radiation is constant and significant. For example, people around the globe were exposed to radioactive fallout from hundreds of nuclear bomb test explosions in the atmosphere during the cold war. Today, medical patients choose to be exposed to regular doses of radiation from millions of X-rays and CT scans.

### Nuclear meltdowns don’t kill anyone – Empirically Proven.

Nuclear Engineering International May 5, 2011 ( “Fukushima Daiichi crisis - The first month”.) DOA: 7.25.11

No deaths and only two serious injuries are attributable to restoration work of the Fukushima Daiichi plant, according to data from utility TEPCO as of 11 April. The earthquake and tsunami claimed seven lives, including two workers who were found in the basement of the Fukushima Daiichi unit 4 turbine hall in early April. They were checking equipment at the basement of turbine building of Unit 4 when the tsunami hit, and had been missing since then. As of 11 April, no workers were unaccounted for. As of 13 April, a total of 22 workers had receive a dose of greater than 100 mSv, 19 employees of utility TEPCO and three of other contractors. None have received a dose greater than 250 mSv.

## 1NC Nuclear Meltdowns – Hormesis

### Nuclear meltdowns Good – Radiation from nuclear meltdowns would actually benefit the public.

Solomon Tuesday, 22 March 20 11: (Lawrence, Lawrence Solomon is a Canadian writer on the environment and the founder and executive director of Energy Probe, a Canadian environmental agency. His writing has appeared in a number of newspapers, including The National Post where he has a column, and he is the author of several books on energy resources, urban sprawl, and global warming, Fears Over Fukushima Radiation Overblown 09:02 Lawrence Solomon, Financial Post. http://www.thegwpf.org/science-news/2678-lawrence-solomon-fears-over-fukushima-radiation-overblown.html)

The immense suffering that the Japanese are enduring in the aftermath of their earthquake and tsunami is now compounded by torment over radiation releases from the Fukushima nuclear plant. While the torment is understandable, based on the reported amounts of radiation released, it is uncalled for. The evidence from Japan’s populace — inadvertent guinea pigs in the largest radiation experiment ever, in the aftermath of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 — indicates that fears over radiation can be overblown. Those who survived the immediate atomic blasts but were near Ground Zero died at a high rate from excess exposure to radiation. The tens of thousands more distant from Ground Zero, and who received lower exposures to radiation, did not die in droves. To the contrary, and surprisingly, they outlived their counterparts in the general population who received no exposure to radiation from the blasts. These findings come from the Atomic Bomb Disease Institute of the Nagasaki University School of Medicine, which has been analyzing the medical records of survivors continuously since 1968. The voluminous records — based in part on the free twice-a-year medical examinations that 83,050 registered Nagasaki survivors received — provided the researchers with a database of 2.5 million examination items to mine. To determine how the survivors fared, the researchers compared the survivors with Japanese men and women of the same age who had not been exposed to radiation. “Among about 100,000 A-bomb survivors registered at Nagasaki University School of Medicine, male subjects exposed to 31-40 cGy [centigrays] showed significantly lower mortality from non-cancerous diseases than age-matched unexposed males,” the researchers found. “And the death rate for exposed male and female was smaller than that for unexposed.” The 31-40 cGy is a measure of radiation absorption higher than the general population in the vicinity of the plants is likely to have received. The University of Nagasaki study, whose results were consistent with other studies done of the A-bomb survivors, found that high exposures to radiation kill while moderate exposures provide overall general health benefits. While some levels of low exposure did produce a small number of additional cancer deaths, these cancer deaths were more than offset by lower death rates from other causes, such as heart disease and circulatory ailments. The study’s bottom line: “the low doses of A-bomb radiation increased lifespan of A-bomb survivors.” Other studies of A-bomb survivors, which sliced the data in different ways, have also found encouraging news. Those exposed to fewer than 20 cGy of radiation experienced fewer cancer deaths than the general population. The unborn — thought to be at especial risk — showed no adverse effects under 10 cGy. And no genetic defects were found among the 90,000 children and grandchildren of survivor parents who were exposed to average doses of 40 cGy to 60 cGy. Based on the information available to date, all these exposures exceed those the general population in the vicinity of the Fukushima plant is likely to have received. The real-life studies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors indicate that radiation affects the human body much as arsenic, sodium and many other substances do — they are beneficial in small doses, but can be harmful in overdoses. Yet the conventional scientific wisdom rejects these studies, and a multitude of other real-life studies, in favour of what is known as the Linear No-Threshold Assumption. Under this assumption, all exposure to radiation, no matter how small, is harmful in direct proportion to the dose. It is called an assumption because there is no proof of its validity. In fact, the scientists who espouse it freely admit that no proof for their assumption can ever be had because the risk is too small to measure statistically. In the absence of proof, they say, the only safe course is to assume danger. Yet assuming danger where none exists is in itself dangerous, particularly in a country with the culture of Japan. The atomic bomb survivors were known as hibakusha or “explosion-affected people”— a stigma connoting damaged goods that made them less marriageable, less worthy of association, and less worthy even in their own minds. Even if those recently irradiated by Fukushima escape this epithet, the burden of living in fear for their health and that of their offspring could be great. Damage to the psyche aside, some 200,000 people have been evacuated from 10 towns in the vicinity of the nuclear plant, many of whom now find themselves in poorly heated makeshift shelters where they must make do without adequate food and water, and numerous others have been told to stay indoors. Worse, if the budding panic over radiation spreads, the region around Fukushima — one of Japan’s most productive farming areas — may be tainted or even abandoned for agriculture. The Japanese government has already banned the sale of milk and spinach produced in the plant’s environs, and consumers in other countries, fearing contamination, are shying away from all Japanese produce. The only evidence that exists as to the health of humans who have been irradiated at low levels points to a benefit, not a harm. Difficult though it may be to overcome the fear of radiation that has been drubbed into us since childhood, there is no scientific proof whatsoever to view the radiation emitted from the Fukushima plant as dangerous to the Japanese population, and certainly no reason for the Japanese to view those living near the plant as damaged goods. In all likelihood, though, many will nevertheless be viewed as such. If so, that will be one more tragedy heaped among the others that the affected Japanese population will need to endure.

## 2AC A2: Hormesis

### Radiation is extremely detrimental to all life it is NOT beneficial – Their authors lie to promote the nuclear industry.

Caldicott May 1, 2011 Helen, a founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility, is the author of ''Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer.' 'Who also is an Australian physician, author, and anti-nuclear advocate who has founded several associations dedicated to opposing the use of depleted uranium munitions, nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons proliferation, war and military action in general. She hosts a weekly radio program, If You Love This Planet. Sunday Late Edition - Final Unsafe At Any Dose BYLINE: By HELEN CALDICOTT. SECTION: Section WK; Column 0; Editorial Desk; OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR; Pg. 10 The New York Times)

SIX weeks ago, when I first heard about the reactor damage at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan, I knew the prognosis: If any of the containment vessels or fuel pools exploded, it would mean millions of new cases of cancer in the Northern Hemisphere. Many advocates of nuclear power would deny this. During the 25th anniversary last week of the Chernobyl disaster, some commentators asserted that few people died in the aftermath, and that there have been relatively few genetic abnormalities in survivors' offspring. It's an easy leap from there to arguments about the safety of nuclear energy compared to alternatives like coal, and optimistic predictions about the health of the people living near Fukushima. But this is dangerously ill informed and short-sighted; if anyone knows better, it's doctors like me**.** There's great debate about the number of fatalities following Chernobyl; the International Atomic Energy Agency has predicted that there will be only about 4,000 deaths from cancer, but a 2009 report published by the New York Academy of Sciences says that almost one million people have already perished from cancer and other diseases. The high doses of radiation caused so many miscarriages that we will never know the number of genetically damaged fetuses that did not come to term. (And both Belarus and Ukraine have group homes full of deformed children.) Nuclear accidents never cease. We're decades if not generations away from seeing the full effects of the radioactive emissions from Chernobyl. As we know from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it takes years to get cancer. Leukemia takes only 5 to 10 years to emerge, but solid cancers take 15 to 60. Furthermore, most radiation-induced mutations are recessive; it can take many generations for two recessive genes to combine to form a child with a particular disease, like my specialty, cystic fibrosis. We can't possibly imagine how many cancers and other diseases will be caused in the far future by the radioactive isotopes emitted by Chernobyl and Fukushima. Doctors understand these dangers. We work hard to try to save the life of a child dying of leukemia. We work hard to try to save the life of a woman dying of metastatic breast cancer. And yet the medical dictum says that for incurable diseases, the only recourse is prevention. There's no group better prepared than doctors to stand up to the physicists of the nuclear industry. Still, physicists talk convincingly about ''permissible doses'' of radiation. They consistently ignore internal emitters -- radioactive elements from nuclear power plants or weapons tests that are ingested or inhaled into the body, giving very high doses to small volumes of cells. They focus instead on generally less harmful external radiation from sources outside the body, whether from isotopes emitted from nuclear power plants, medical X-rays, cosmic radiation or background radiation that is naturally present in our environment. However, doctors know that there is no such thing as a safe dose of radiation, and that radiation is cumulative. The mutations caused in cells by this radiation are generally deleterious. We all carry several hundred genes for disease: cystic fibrosis, diabetes, phenylketonuria, muscular dystrophy. There are now more than 2,600 genetic diseases on record, any one of which may be caused by a radiation-induced mutation, and many of which we're bound to see more of, because we are artificially increasing background levels of radiation. For many years now, physicists employed by the nuclear industry have been outperforming doctors, at least in politics and the news media. Since the Manhattan Project in the 1940s, physicists have had easy access to Congress. They had harnessed the energy in the atom, and later physicists, whether lobbying for nuclear weapons or nuclear energy, had the same power. They walk into Congress and Congress virtually prostrates itself. Their technological advancements are there for all to see; the harm will become apparent only decades later. Doctors, by contrast, have fewer dates with Congress, and much less access on nuclear issues. We don't typically go around discussing the latent period of carcinogenesis and the amazing advances made in understanding radiobiology. But as a result, we do an inadequate job of explaining the long-term dangers of radiation to policymakers and the public. When patients come to us with cancer, we deem it rude to inquire if they lived downwind of Three Mile Island in the 1980s or might have eaten Hershey's chocolate made with milk from cows that grazed in irradiated pastures nearby. We tend to treat the disaster after the fact, instead of fighting to stop it from happening in the first place. Doctors need to confront the nuclear industry. Nuclear power is neither clean, nor sustainable, nor an alternative to fossil fuels -- in fact, it adds substantially to global warming. Solar, wind and geothermal energy, along with conservation, can meet our energy needs. At the beginning, we had no sense that radiation induced cancer. Marie Curie and her daughter didn't know that the radioactive materials they handled would kill them. But it didn't take long for the early nuclear physicists in the Manhattan Project to recognize the toxicity of radioactive elements. I knew many of them quite well. They had hoped that peaceful nuclear energy would absolve their guilt over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it has only extended it. Physicists had the knowledge to begin the nuclear age. Physicians have the knowledge, credibility and legitimacy to end it.

## 1NC Water Wars

### Empirics disprove and no statistical data – no water wars escalation

Katz, Enviro Studies Prof at Tel Aviv, ’11 (David, February, “Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars” Global Environmental Politics, Vol 11 No 1, ProjectMuse)

Critiques of the Water War Hypothesis A number critiques have been leveled against both the theory and the empirical evidence behind the water wars hypothesis. One critique of the environmental security literature, of which much of the published material on water wars is guilty, is that warnings and threats of future violence are often considered as evidence.28 Statements from the 1980s that the next war in the Middle East will be over water have already proven false. Research has shown, however, that even the more general predictions of imminent water wars that are based on comments by officials may be suspect. Leng, for instance, found no correlation between the frequency of threats of war and the onset of war.29 Examining conflict and cooperation over water resources, Yoffe and colleagues noted over 400 incidents of water-related verbal exchanges by political figures between 1948 and 1999 that were conflictual in nature, but only 37 instances of violent conflict of varying levels of intensity. Thirty of these were from the Middle East, none were [End Page 15] more recent than 1970, none were all-out wars, and in none was water the central cause of conflict.30 Proponents of water war scenarios often premise their dire conclusions on the fact that water is essential for life and non-substitutable.31 Yet water for basic needs represents a small share of total water use, even in arid countries.32 Economists and others point out that over 80 percent of world freshwater withdrawals are for the agricultural sector, a relatively low-value use and one in which large gains in efficiency could be made by changes in irrigation techniques and choice of crops. Thus, economic critiques of the water war hypothesis stress that the value of water that would be gained from military conflict is unlikely to outweigh the economic costs of military preparation and battle, much less the loss of life.33 Some authors have even questioned the empirical basis for the conclusion that freshwater is increasingly scarce,34 an assumption on which the water war hypothesis relies. Such a “cornucopian” view claims that people adapt to scarcity through improvements in technology, pricing, and efficiency—rendering water less scarce, not more so. Perhaps the strongest case against the likelihood of water wars is the lack of empirical evidence of precedents. Wolf found only one documented case of war explicitly over water, and this took place over 4500 years ago.35 Moreover, he could document only seven cases of acute conflict over water. Yoffe and colleagues also find that armed conflict over water resources has been uncommon.36 They found that cooperation was much more common than conflict, both globally and in all world regions except the Middle East/North Africa. This pattern may explain why only a limited number of case studies of water conflict are presented in the water wars literature. Analysts have criticized environmental security arguments that are based on case studies because such works tend to have no variation in the dependent variable.37 Many large sample statistical studies have attempted to address such shortcomings, however, in several cases these studies too have come under fire. For instance, a number of large-sample statistical studies find correlations between water-related variables and conflict, however, few, if any, provide convincing support for causal relationships. Moreover, several studies found that water availability had no impact on the likelihood of either domestic or international conflict,38 including at least one study that attempted to replicate earlier studies [End Page 16] that claimed to have found such correlations.39 Moreover, the results of several studies that do find correlations between water and conflict are either not robust or are contrasted by other findings. For instance, Raleigh and Urdal find that the statistical significance of water scarcity variables is highly dependent on one or two observations, leading them to conclude that actual effects of water scarcity “are weak, negligible or insignificant.”40 Jensen and Gleditsch find that the results of Miguel and colleagues are less robust when using a recoding of the original dataset.41 Gleditsch and colleagues found that shared basins do predict an increased propensity for conflict, but found no correlation between conflict and drought, the number of river crossings, or the share of the basin upstream, leading them to state that “support for a scarcity theory of water conflict is somewhat ambiguous.”42 Evidence and Perception In sum, despite some instances of violent conflict over water, there is little systematic evidence of war over water resources. Evidence for a deterministic relationship between water scarcity and the outbreak of armed conflict is particularly weak. Less ambitious claims that water shortages will contribute to insecurity, which can, in turn, lead to violent conflict, have more empirical support. Even here, however, the importance of water as a causal variable is questionable. Several studies have found that variables such as regime type and institutional capacity are much more important indicators of conflict potential,43 and may have mitigating effects on any water-conflict link. As a consequence of accumulated research, many scholars have concluded that risks of water wars are low,44 and others have toned down or qualified their statements about the likelihood of future water wars.45 Some governmental reports have limited their contentions to highlighting that water scarcity can aggravate conflicts and increase insecurity,46 and many studies now emphasize water as a tool for cooperation.47 Warnings and predictions of imminent water [End Page 17] wars continue to be commonplace, however. In a review of published academic literature, Gupta and van der Zaag find that articles on water conflict outnumber those on cooperation by nearly three to one, and are five times more likely to be cited.48

## 2NC Water Wars 1/2

### Their evidence is political and media hype – discount it

Katz, Enviro Studies Prof at Tel Aviv, ’11 (David, February, “Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars” Global Environmental Politics, Vol 11 No 1, ProjectMuse)

Incentives to Stress a Water War Scenario Incentives Presented in Existing Literature Observers have noted that various actors may have incentives to stress or even exaggerate the risks of water wars. Lonergan notes, for instance, that in “many cases, the comments are little more than media hype; in others, statements have been made for political reasons.”49 Beyond mere acknowledgement of the possibility of such incentives, however, little research has attempted to understand what these incentives are and how they may differ between actors. An understanding of the different motivations of various groups of actors to stress the possibility of imminent water wars can help explain the continued seemingly disproportionate popularity of such messages and help to evaluate such warnings more critically. Mueller offers a general explanation for a focus on violence in public discourse by postulating that, following the end of the Cold War, policy-makers, the press, and various analysts seek to fill a “catastrophe quota.”50 According to this theory, various actors seek out new areas of potential violence to justify fears that had become commonplace during the Cold War period. Simon, while not specifically addressing environmental conflict, suggests four possible reasons for academic researchers to offer what he claimed were overly gloomy scenarios resulting from resource scarcity.51 The first reason is that international funding organizations are eager to fund research dealing with crises, but not work that produces good news. The second is that bad news sells more newspapers and books. The third is a psychological predisposition to focus on bad news or worst-case scenarios. The fourth is a belief that sounding alarm bells can mobilize action to improve environmental issues. Haas offers two reasons why “exaggerated beliefs about resource scarcity and their possible threats to environmental security persist.” The first is “the absence of any consensual mechanism for reconciling inter-discourse (or interparadigm) disputes.” This, Haas argues, allows for ideological disputes to continue [End Page 18] 8 self-interested political actors can borrow from discourses that are similar in their ontology and structure and that justify pre-existing political ambitions.”52 Trottier, addressing the risks of water wars specifically, suggests that certain private-sector actors in the water industry may stress the risks of water wars in order to promote water-related infrastructure.53

### Hyping the impact of water wars makes conflict more likely

Katz, Enviro Studies Prof at Tel Aviv, ’11 (David, February, “Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars” Global Environmental Politics, Vol 11 No 1, ProjectMuse)

The efficacy of such rhetorical strategies remains unclear. Overstating risks of water wars or oversimplifying causal links may be detrimental to intended objectives. For instance, raising the specter of war to raise attention to, or mobilize action on, related environmental or development issues may ultimately result in redirecting resources away from development and towards conflict prevention. [End Page 29] Moreover, there is a risk that policy-makers and other decision-makers may feel that as long as violent conflict is avoided, they have been successful. Alternatively, by focusing on water as a cause of violent conflict, attention may be drawn away from more important or proximate causes of such conflict. It is not the intent of this study to imply that actors acting on these various incentives intend to mislead or manipulate public opinion. It is legitimate to highlight worst-case scenarios and to promote measures to avoid them. Rather, this study suggests that numerous and varied incentives facing several actors to stress or even exaggerate the possibility of such conflict may help to explain the significant exposure and tractability that such threats and warnings have received to date. This study was meant to be suggestive rather than conclusive. It did not attempt to estimate the actual influence of the various incentives laid out above in motivating the behavior of the set of actors discussed. Nor did it suggest methods for identifying when such incentives are in fact responsible for actions by a given party. Some of the incentives, such as raising the exposure of other environmental issues, use of signaling by politicians, and need for catchy headlines, appear to have much empirical support, while others have less. Because this analysis relies on plausible hypotheses backed up with anecdotal evidence, it is subject to many of the same critiques leveled against much of the early environmental security literature. Verification of the relative importance of the various incentives laid out in this study is left to future research. Future research may also evaluate possible incentives actors may face to underestimate such risks—for instance, in order to encourage investment or influence negotiations. Such incentives no doubt exist, but were not addressed herein. Such limitations noted, this study does provide analysts with a framework with which to start evaluating various claims regarding the prospects of violent conflict over water and other natural resources. Analysts have long acknowledged “that one cannot dismiss the political motives of those who wished to elevate—or prevent the elevation—of environmental concerns to the same status as military ones.”114 The intent of this study was to provide a clearer picture of these motives, with the hope that this will assist analysts in evaluating the credibility of the many diverse pronouncements on this subject. While the specific topic of this study was conflict over water, much of the analysis is relevant to discussions of conflict over other natural resources and to broader discussions of environmental security.

2NC Water Wars 2/2

### Motivated by authors reputation and desire for funding

Katz, Enviro Studies Prof at Tel Aviv, ’11 (David, February, “Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars” Global Environmental Politics, Vol 11 No 1, ProjectMuse)

Raise the Profile of the Author or Organization Similar to the desire to draw attention to a cause, framing water issues in a security context can be a means of raising the profile of an organization or author. Again, this incentive is probably most dramatic for NGOs. Many observers have noted that NGOs and other “non-elites” can face serious challenges in attracting attention. Some have resorted to “exceptionally strange or violent acts as a substitute for their lack of status or resources” in order to attract the media’s eye.63 However, as some have noted, while “the benefit of outlandish behavior is media attention, the price is that you get stuck in this role or caricaturization.”64 In order for their organization and message to be taken more seriously, many environmental organizations have moved away from such tactics.65 Increasing the severity of their message is one tactic to attract attention while toning down behavior. In the case of academics, connecting water to security also offers researchers a way to raise the profile of their work, given the salience of security issues in high-level policy circles and with the general public. Doing so increases the potential to gain access to policy-makers and the media. There is some evidence that water research stressing conflict potential may be more likely to be published.66 Furthermore, combining environmental and security issues expands the number and types of journals in which academics can publish. Moreover, by gaining exposure to audiences outside their particular field of expertise, researchers also expand possibilities for further research collaboration. Expand Pools of Available Funding Several actors face financial incentives to reference the possibilities for water wars. Conflict can affect terms and levels of investment. There is some evidence to support Trottier’s claim that certain private industry actors may stress the risks of war in order to encourage policy-makers to invest in water infrastructure.67 A representative of a desalination facility under [End Page 22] construction in Israel commented, for instance, that “unfortunately water is one of the reasons that create war. If you compare the cost of one F-16, it is more or less the cost of this desalination plant. I believe at the end of the day it will be much cheaper to solve conflict based on this type of plant than through buying new F-16s.”68 The website of a developer of large bags that can be filled with water and towed quotes World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin’s statement that the next century’s wars will be over water and then claims that “Waterbag technology will have a direct impact on the Peace Process in the Middle East.”69 Other types of actors also face financial incentives to stress risks of water wars. Many NGOs are engaged in a constant search for funding, as are many academics. Both NGOs and academics with a focus on environmental, development, or security stand to benefit by expanding their focus to include some aspect of environmental security, as adding additional fields increases the pools of funding available. This is especially true for those adding the security element to their core focus, given the large pools of funding frequently available for security issues. In addition, many NGOs use press coverage as evidence of their effectiveness in awareness-raising vis-à-vis current and future sources of funding. As already mentioned, stressing war can increase the likelihood of media exposure.

### Water scarcity is not the cause of wars – empirically true

Lomborg 1 (Bjorn, Professor of Statistics, University of Aarhus, The Skeptical Environmentalist, pp. 156-7)JFS

There is actually good reason why we should expect the water war argument to be seriously overstated. First,waging a war for water simply makes very little strategic sense. What would be the goal? Only downstream, strong states have the motivation and ability, but they are forever vulnerable to retribution from upstream states intentionally polluting the water source. So a war would require not just a simple power demonstration but a permanent occupation and possible depopulation of the entire watershed.’ Second, such a war would be extremely costly, especially compared to the price of desalination. As an Israeli Defense Forces analyst pointed out: “Why go to war over water? For the price of one week’s fighting, you could build five desalination plants. No loss of life, no international pressure, and a reliable supply you don’t have to defend in hostile territory.” Third, states often share interests in water, with upstream states getting hydropower from dams and downstream states getting better-managed water for agriculture. Finally, water cooperation is highly resilient — the Mekong Committee on water functioned throughout the Vietnam war, Israel and Jordan held secret water talks throughout 30 years of formal war, and the Indus River Commission survived two wars between India and Pakistan. Actually, a number of quarrels have been solved exactly because the problems surrounding water have gained more attention recently. Ever since independence India and Bangladesh have bitterly disputed the rights to water from the Ganges, which is controlled by India but is essential to Bangladesh’s agriculture. After 50 years of India asserting the right to take as much water from the river as it needed, the government signed a treaty in 1996, providing both countries with a guaranteed flow of water in the crucial spring months of March, April and May. Thus, while water will get more valuable, there is little reason to expect this to escalate the number of wars, simply because war makes little strategic or economic sense. Rather, it is to be expected that increased water value will help increase the focus and attention needed to solve the remaining, substantial water issues.